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Abstract 
 
Using two identification strategies based on a Bayesian Structural VAR and a Sign- 
Restriction VAR, we examine the real effects of financial stress in the Eurozone. In 
particular, we assess the macroeconomic impact of: (i) a monetary policy shock; and 
(ii) a financial stress shock. We find that a monetary policy contraction strongly 
deteriorates financial stress conditions. In addition, unexpected variation in the 
Financial Stress Index (FSI) plays an important role in explaining output fluctuations, 
and also demands an aggressive response by the monetary authority to stabilise output 
indicating a preference shift from targeting inflation as it is currently happening in 
major economies. Therefore, our paper reveals the importance of adopting a vigilant 
posture towards financial stress conditions, as well as the urgency of macro-prudential 
risk management. 
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1. Introduction 
The most recent financial crisis, which began in the US in the summer of 2007 with the 
bursting of the sub-prime mortgage market, unleashed a full-blown systemic crisis with 
global risk aversion dramatically increasing, and asset markets across countries and 
regions plunging, in particular, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. Stock markets tumbled in all regions, large fiscal stimulus packages were 
implemented posing enormous challenges to long-run fiscal sustainability, while at the 
same time spreads on sovereign debt widened and currency markets came under 
pressure. Even market economies with sound macroeconomic and financial 
preconditions built-up over the previous years were strongly affected. 
The initial contagion from the US to international financial markets quickly 
morphed into real sector problems and revealed the strength of the linkages between the 
financial system, the housing sector, the banking sector and the credit market (Martin 
and Milas, 2010). Such a rapid spillover from the financial to the real sector, whereby 
many countries saw their domestic industrial production, investment rates and, more 
generally, their GDP growth rate plunging, suggests that the nexus between monetary 
stability and financial stability may be strong (Granville and Mallick, 2009; Castro 
2010a; Sousa, 2010a, 2010b) and that financial stress conditions can have an important 
impact on domestic demand and the likelihood of "boom-bust" episodes and expansion 
and contraction ending (Castro, 2010b). 
Moreover, in the wake of the financial crisis, policy priority has apparently 
shifted towards stabilising the financial system and aiding economic recovery rather 
than targeting inflation. Financial stability has become an important explicit goal for 
Central banks. As monetary policies are primarily designed to promote price stability, 
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there could be exogenous finance shocks due to systemic risks in the financial system 
that could cause financial stress, which in turn can dampen macroeconomic activity.  
Following a related line of thinking in the literature, the proposition that 
monetary innovations do not have long-run real effects is far from unequivocally 
established (Espinosa-Vega, 1998). In this context, long-run monetary neutrality has 
been a key building block of mainstream business cycle research (Taylor, 1995; Aksoy 
and León-Ledesma, 2005).  If money is neutral in the long-run, financial shocks that 
could be due to build up of monetary bubbles should have no effect on the real 
economy. But as we have seen in the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, the crisis or 
the imbalances in financial markets reflected in an unexpected financial shock do have 
noticeable impact on macroeconomic activity, suggesting that the monetary bubble 
before the current crisis has possibly led to the observed non-neutrality outcome. The 
turmoil in financial markets has, therefore, renewed this debate on the potential spill-
over effects from the financial sector to the real economy. This paper contributes to this 
debate by providing new evidence on the linkages between financial and monetary 
policy shocks, as financial innovations can obscure the relationship between monetary 
policy and real activity. 
In this paper, we therefore aim at assessing the impact of a financial shock 
alongside other macroeconomic shocks in the Eurozone. A financial shock is designed 
here as an innovation in the Financial Stress Index (ECB, 2009; IMF, 2008, 2009), 
which we build using country-level information on financial stress conditions following 
the work of Cardarelli et al. (2011). Extreme values in this Financial Stress Index (FSI) 
indicate financial crises. 
So we set up a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model with 6 key 
macroeconomic variables: the interest rate (that is, the policy rate); a set of 
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macroeconomic variables that adjust to the shock with a lag (real GDP, inflation rate, 
and the commodity price); and a set of variables that react contemporaneously to the 
policy shock (the growth rate of the monetary aggregate, and the Financial Stress Index) 
with the goal of identifying the macroeconomic effects of a shock to monetary policy 
and a shock to financial stress conditions, focusing on the Eurozone as a monetary 
union. 
Monetary policy can operate through both an interest rate and liquidity channel. 
A liquidity measure is included along with interest rate and FSI, as it is a key variable 
measuring financial stability. Monetary policy decisions to improve liquidity conditions 
can be unsuccessful, if decreasing interest rate to raise liquidity results in higher 
inflation, the so-called paradox of credibility.  So it is the liquidity channel that must be 
identified and should be monitored to detect signs of instability. This requires 
estimating the effect of monetary or more recent quantitative easing technique to 
explore whether easing liquidity conditions can generate any inflationary pressure at a 
time of depressed real sector, along with uncovering the effect of financial shocks.  
The broad concern of monetary policy in Eurozone is to maintain price stability. 
Any analysis of monetary policy behaviour should include both interest rates and 
money growth in the empirical exercise, as well as the inflation rate. The consideration 
of commodity prices in the VAR is explained by the need for eliminating the price 
puzzle by the inclusion of such forward looking variable that captures expected 
inflation. 
We contribute to the literature in two important respects: (i) we look explicitly at 
the real effect of financial shocks; and (ii) we use different identification strategies to 
jointly identify monetary and financial shocks as both could have implications for 
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monetary liquidity in the system and, hence, liquidity crises may spill over to other 
macroeconomic variables.  
We identify the monetary policy and the financial stress shocks using modern 
estimation techniques, namely, the Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-Regressive (B-
SVAR) and the Sign-Restrictions VAR and, thereby, account for the uncertainty about 
the impulse-response functions. We, therefore, identify simultaneously and uniquely 
contractionary monetary policy shocks and an adverse finance shock to examine their 
real effects. We provide evidence that finance shock plays a dominant role in explaining 
output fluctuations relative to monetary policy shocks. 
We show that a monetary policy contraction: (i) strongly deteriorates financial 
stress conditions; (ii) has a negative effect on output; (iii) leads to a quick fall in the 
commodity price, but the aggregate price level exhibits strong persistence; and (iv) 
produces a small liquidity effect. As for the shock to financial stress conditions, it: (i) 
has a contractionary effect on output; (ii) negatively impacts on the commodity price 
and the inflation rate; and (iii) generates a strong fall in the interest rate. 
In addition, we find that episodes of an increase in financial stress demand a 
strong response by the monetary authority, namely, via the adoption of expansionary 
policies. It is evident from our results that the interest rate channel seems to have 
changed in the post-euro period, while the asset market channel (the financial stress 
effects of monetary policy) does appear more important. This means low inflation could 
exist alongside bubbles in house or stock markets. For example, lower interest rates 
could push loans, reduce the bank deposit-loan ratio and increase probabilities of 
turmoil events in financial markets.  
Finally, the empirical results suggest that variation in financial stress conditions 
is largely unexpected. Nevertheless, our framework seems to capture pretty well the 
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developments of the 2008-2009 financial turmoil. In particular, they highlight the 
importance of adopting a vigilant posture towards financial stress conditions, as well as 
the urgency of macro-prudential risk management.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation 
methodologies and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the main findings of the paper and the policy 
implications. 
 
2. Estimation Methodology 
2.1. The B-SVAR Framework 
We estimate the following Structural VAR (SVAR) 
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tsX st , Γ(L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of 
the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, εt are the fundamental 
economic shocks that span the space of innovations to Xt, and vt is the VAR innovation. 
Monetary policy can be characterized as 
i
ttt fi  )(     (3) 
where, it is the Central Bank rate, f is a linear function, t  is the information set, and 
i
t  is the interest rate shock. 
We consider a recursive identification scheme and assume that the variables in 
Xt can be separated into 3 groups: (i) a subset of n1 variables, X1t, which do not respond 
contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock; (ii) a subset of n2 variables, X2t, that 
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respond contemporaneously to it; and (iii) the policy instrument in the form of the 
Central Bank rate, it.  
As in Christiano et al. (2005), the recursive assumptions can be summarized by 
 '21 ,, tttt XiXX   and 
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Finally, the impulse-response function to a one standard-deviation shock under 
the normalization of I  is given by: 
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We use a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm to assess uncertainty about 
its distribution. We construct probability intervals by drawing from the Normal-Inverse-
Wishart posterior distribution of B(L) and Σ 
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where B(L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L 
associated with the regression coefficients, β is the vector of regression coefficients in 
the VAR system, Σ is the covariance matrix of the residuals, the variables with a hat are 
the corresponding maximum-likelihood estimates, X is the matrix of regressors, T is the 
sample size and m is the number of estimated parameters per equation. 
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2.2. The Sign-Restrictions Approach 
In this section, we describe the method in estimating the effects of unexpected shocks 
by means of Sign-Restrictions, following Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009). Identification via Sign-Restrictions is relevant in this context, as our objective is 
to investigate the effect of shocks due to surprise movements in interest rates and 
financial stress, by designing two shocks via restrictions on the variables in the VAR. 
This can help provide a better structural interpretation of shocks. Consider the reduced-
form VAR that has a MA representation as follows: 
 
1 1
1
1 ( )
t t t
t t t
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
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                (8) 
where the vector Y includes the changes in commodity price, output growth, inflation, 
short-term interest rate, money growth, and the financial stress index. B(L) is a lag 
polynomial of order p. The usual SVAR approach assumes that the error terms, ut, are 
related to structural macroeconomic shocks, vt, via a matrix P: t tu Pv . The covariance 
matrix of the vector of reduced-form residuals u is denoted as . Identification in the 
structural VAR literature amounts to providing enough restrictions to uniquely solve for 
the following decomposition of the nn estimated covariance matrix of the reduced-
form VAR residuals . 
' ' ' '[ , ] [ ]t t t tE u u PE v v P PP    .                (9) 
This defines a one-to-one mapping from the vector of orthogonal structural shocks v to 
the reduced-form residuals u. The jth column of the identifying matrix P,  , is called an 
impulse vector, as it maps the innovation to the jth structural shock vj into the 
contemporaneous impact responses of all the n variables. With the structural impulse 
vector   in hand, the set of all structural impulse responses of the n variables up to the 
horizon k can then be computed using the estimated coefficient matrix B(L) of the 
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reduced-form VAR.
1
 Thus the Sign-Restriction approach amounts to simultaneously 
estimating the coefficients of the reduced-form VAR and the impulse vector. 
„Identifying restrictions‟ on the responses of a subset of the variables are imposed for 
horizons k = 0, …, K, after the shock (Uhlig, 2005). Let Λ be an orthonormal matrix, 
that is, a matrix with the property: ' ' I   . The relationship between the reduced 
from residuals and the structural relationship can then be described as follows:  
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Identification here requires Sign-Restrictions on λ, which is restricted to be in a 
certain subset of [–,]. The restrictions will not give one impulse response, but a whole 
range of responses. The identification method searches over the space of possible 
impulse vectors to find those impulse responses that agree with the theoretical Sign-
Restrictions. Once the impulse vector   has been appropriated, the impulse responses 
are calculated as:  ( )t tY B L P v  . 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the empirical 
analysis. All variables are in natural logarithms and measured at constant prices unless 
stated otherwise. 
Euro area aggregates are calculated as the weighted average of euro-11 before 
1999 and, thereafter, as break-corrected series covering the real-time composition. The 
weights are computed using GDP at irrevocable fixed exchange rates. 
For both identification procedures, the variables in X1t – the ones predetermined 
with respect to monetary policy innovations – are the commodity price index, PCmt , 
                                                 
1
 See Dedola and Neri (2007), and Rafiq and Mallick (2008) for more details. 
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the real GDP, Yt , and the inflation rate, πt. The variables in X2t – the ones allowed to 
react contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks – are the growth rate of broad 
money, M3t −M1t , and the Financial Stress Index, FSIt. That is, the recursive 
assumptions defined in (3) can be explicitly represented by Xt =[X1t’, it, X2t’], where X1t 
= [PCmt, Yt, πt] and X2t = [M3t −M1t, FSIt]. We use the interest rate denoted by it as the 
monetary policy instrument. We include in the set of exogenous variables a constant 
and a time trend. The selected optimal lag length is 4, in accordance with the standard 
likelihood ratio tests. 
The main data source is the European Central Bank (ECB). As for the Financial 
Stress Index, it is computed using country-level data provided by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and, in particular, following the work of Cardarelli et al. (2011). 
The sample covers the period 1980:1-2008:4 for which data are available at quarterly 
frequency. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. The B-SVAR Framework 
We include the growth rate of the monetary aggregate and the Financial Stress Index in 
the set of variables that react contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock (X2t). 
Similarly, the GDP, the inflation rate and the commodity price are allowed to react to 
monetary policy only with a lag (being, therefore, included in X1t). 
We start by analyzing the impact of a monetary policy shock (i.e. a change in the 
interest rate. We identify the monetary policy shock by imposing the recursive 
assumptions defined in (4) and estimate the Bayesian Structural VAR (B-SVAR) 
represented by (1) and (2). 
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Figure 1 plots the impulse-response functions to a positive shock in the interest 
rate. The solid line corresponds to the point estimate, the red line represents the median 
response, and the dashed lines are the 68% posterior confidence intervals estimated by 
using a Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain algorithm based on 10000 draws. 
The results suggest that after a contractionary monetary policy, financial stress 
increases substantially for about 4 quarters after which it starts falling, but the positive 
effect persists for 12 quarters. The impact is sizeable: at the 4-quarter horizon, the 40 
basis points shock in the interest rate rises the financial stress index by almost 40 points. 
Real GDP falls, the trough is reached after 4 quarters, and the effect persist is still 
significant after 10 quarters. The commodity price also decreases and the reaction is 
quick. In addition, the inflation rate is roughly unaffected for 12 quarters, in line with 
the findings of Peersman and Smets (2003). 
The response of the money growth rate increases, reflecting the flight towards 
assets that are less liquid but also earn higher rates of return. Then, as the shock to the 
interest rate erodes, the growth rate starts falling and even becomes negative at around 
after 6 quarters. Indeed, it remains persistently at a lower level even 20 quarters ahead. 
This is in accordance with the works of Friedman (1968), Cagan (1972) and Sousa 
(2010a), who describe this shape of the path of the short-term nominal interest rate 
following a monetary contraction as a short-lived liquidity effect that is followed by 
expected inflation and income effects. It is also in line with the work of Surico (2007a), 
who argues that, although money supply does not affect directly the ECB‟s behaviour, it 
it is a good instrument to predict future inflation.  
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Figure 1 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
monetary policy shock. 
 
The strategy for estimating the parameters of the model focuses on the portion of 
fluctuations in the data that is caused by a monetary policy shock. It is, therefore, 
natural to ask how large that component is. With this question in mind, Figure 2 
displays the percentage of variance of the k-step-ahead forecast error due to an interest 
rate shock. Notice that policy shocks account for an impressive fraction of the variation 
of the financial stress conditions: the forecast-error variance decomposition suggests 
that the interest rate shock represents almost 20% of the variation at the 6-quarter 
horizon. Moreover, the monetary contraction represents only a small fraction of the 
variation of the inflation rate and the commodity price (about 5% of the variation 20 
quarters ahead). On the other hand, monetary policy shocks are responsible for a 
reasonable fraction of the variation of GDP (about 10% of the variation 20 quarters 
ahead). A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the money growth: monetary 
policy shocks explain about 8% of the variation in the monetary aggregate 20 quarters 
ahead. 
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Figure 2 - Percentage variance decomposition using a B-SVAR framework: 
monetary policy shock. 
 
We now build a VAR counter-factual exercise aimed at describing the effects of 
shutting down the shocks in interest rate. In practice, after estimating the B-SVAR 
summarized by (1) and (2), we construct the counter-factual (CFT) series as follows: 
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This is equivalent to consider the following vector of structural shocks: 
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The empirical exercise allows one to analyze the role played by monetary policy 
shocks, and it helps understanding what the financial stress conditions and the 
macroeconomic dynamics would be in the case of absence of unexpected variation in 
the interest rate. 
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Figure 3 plots the actual and the counter-factual series for the variables included 
in the B-SVAR, and suggests a considerable difference between the two and, therefore, 
the importance of interest rate shocks. Moreover, it can be seen that the role of 
monetary policy actions for financial stress conditions seems to be particularly 
significant during the recession period of 1991-1993, but also during the recent financial 
turmoil. 
 
Figure 3 – Actual and counter-factual series using the B-SVAR framework: 
monetary policy shock. 
   
   
 
In Figure 4, we plot the the impulse-response functions to a positive shock in 
financial stress conditions. It can be seen that it has a contractionary effect on output: 
real GDP falls for about 6 quarters. Similarly, the deterioration of financial stress 
conditions impacts negatively on both the commodity price and the inflation rate, 
although the reaction of the first one is faster and also erodes more quickly: while the 
 15 
negative effect on commodity prices disappears after 4 quarters, the reaction of inflation 
persists for almost 8 quarters. The reaction of the money market is interesting. The 
interest rate gradually falls after the shock in financial stress and the trough (of almost 
25 basis points) is reached after 4 quarters. Noticeably, the negative effect persists for 
almost 10 quarters, thereby, suggesting that episodes of financial stress demand a strong 
response by monetary authorities. Consequently, money growth rises. This result is 
similar in spirit to the work of Svensson (1999), who argues that interest rate 
smoothing, output stabilization and model uncertainty call for a more gradual 
adjustment of the conditional inflation forecast toward the inflation target. 
 
Figure 4 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
financial stress shock. 
 
Figure 5 also reveals the important macroeconomic role played by financial 
stress conditions: at the 20 quarter horizon, the shock to financial stress explains about 
10% of the variation in real GDP, inflation and commodity price, and near 8% of the 
change in money growth. Interestingly, it exhibits a major role on monetary policy 
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conduction, as the fraction of variation in the interest rate that is explained by the 
financial stress shock is almost 15%. Similarly, the episodes of deterioration of financial 
stress tend to be relatively persistent and long-lasting: they represent almost 40% of 
their own variation after 20 quarters. 
 
Figure 5 - Percentage variance decomposition using a B-SVAR framework: 
financial stress shock. 
 
Finally, we estimate the B-SVAR summarized by (1), and then construct the following 
counter-factual (CFT) series 
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where we shut down the shocks in financial stress, that is, we consider the vector of 
structural shocks: 
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Figure 6 – Actual and counter-factual series using the B-SVAR framework: 
financial stress shock. 
   
   
 
It can be seen that changes in financial stress conditions are largely unexpected: 
the differences between the actual and the counter-factual series for the Financial Stress 
Index are substantial. In particular, our framework tracks pretty well the developments 
of the 2008-2009 financial turmoil: while the counter-factual series (where shocks are 
annihilated) reveals a small deterioration in financial stress conditions, the actual series 
has actually “over-shot”. This clearly suggests that the financial turbulence observed in 
recent times was strongly unexpected. Nevertheless, the counter-factual series exhibits a 
gradual pick-up in the Financial Stress Index since 2005, which highlights that the 
monetary authority should keep a vigilant posture towards tracking financial stress 
conditions in order to guarantee monetary and financial stability. In this context, our 
work corroborates the findings of Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Davig and Hakkio 
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(2010) for the US. This, therefore, gives rise to the urgency of macro-prudential risk 
management. 
 
4.2. The Sign-Restrictions Approach 
In order to further validate our BVAR results, we carry out the above „pure Sign-
Restriction‟ identification strategy due to Uhlig (2005) using the following Sign-
Restrictions, not only upon impact, but for a few periods after the shock's impact, which 
are shown in the impulse responses in Figures 7 to 14.  
We jointly identify a finance shock alongside a monetary policy shock in order 
to check any difference in these shocks. In the case of monetary policy shock, no 
restriction is placed on the output, as we want it to be determined by the model because 
several factors may influence economic activity. Also we do not determine a priori the 
effect on financial stress, as we wish to know whether monetary policy generates 
financial stress by allowing the impact to be determined by the model. Monetary policy 
shock is identified as an increase in interest rate (short rate) that will lead to a decline in 
monetary liquidity and a decline in inflation. To identify an exogenous finance shock, 
we impose three restrictions that financial stress increases exogenously that can tighten 
monetary liquidity in the system and thereby reduce economic activity. However we do 
not pre-judge the inflation outcome as it can either go up or down depending on whether 
supply shock (innovations in commodity prices) or demand shock (innovations in 
output) dominates. These restrictions seem reasonable in the light of the observed 
pattern in the data. We keep those impulse vectors whose impulse response functions 
satisfy the Sign-Restrictions and discard the others. The Sign-Restrictions imposed here 
are those in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Identifying Sign-Restrictions. 
 CMP GDP INF INT MGR FIN 
Monetary Policy 
Shock 
(tightening) 
? ? – + – ? 
Finance shock 
(Increase in stress) 
? – ? ? – + 
 
The sign restrictions approach only requires a minimal set of economically 
meaningful restrictions as in Table 1 in order to identify contractionary monetary policy 
shocks and finance stress shocks. The responses in Figures 7 and 8 satisfy the sign-
restrictions. The results show how restricting the signs of the impulse responses leads to 
a shaped distribution for the initial response, representing the initial responses when 
drawing the orthogonalised impulse vectors. 
 
Figure 7 -  Histogram for initial impulse-response: monetary policy shock. 
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Figure 8 -  Histogram for initial impulse-response: financial stress shock. 
Distribution of Impact Impulse Response
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The responses do satisfy the Sign-Restrictions even in the long run (see Figures 
9 and 10), although they are required to satisfy the Sign-Restrictions for 2k   quarters 
(i.e., 2 quarters shock), which implies that the shock lasts for at least 2 quarters. The 
error bands are illustrated as the dotted lines above and below the response line (the 
thick line), which are composed of the 16th, 84th and median percentiles of the impulse 
responses for each shock, from a sample of 10000 draws from the posterior. The dotted 
lines also indicate the slope of the posterior distribution of the impulse responses.  
The impulse responses show that a positive shock to financial stress leads to 
permanent decline in output, monetary liquidity, and inflation in the euro area, along 
with a decline in interest rate. Monetary policy innovations on the other hand play a 
modest role in output fluctuations for the Euro area in line with the earlier results in the 
literature, for example, Rafiq and Mallick (2008) for the three largest Euro area 
countries.  
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Figure 9 – Impulse-response functions using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
monetary policy shock (IR>0, DM<0, DP<0), with monetary shock identified first and 
then financial stress shock. 
 
Figure 10 - Impulse-response functions using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
financial stress shock (FS>0, DM<0, GDP<0), with monetary shock identified first and 
then financial stress shock. 
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We also carry out forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD) of the 
monetary and finance shocks identified on the basis of Sign-Restrictions in order to find 
the percentage variation in each variable explained by each shock. This information can 
be found in Figures 11 and 12. The results suggest that finance shocks explain output 
growth more than the monetary policy shocks. This provides relatively limited 
importance of monetary policy shocks in the Eurozone on average. Besides, we 
supplement the above analysis that uses impulse responses and variance decomposition 
by undertaking historical decomposition to provide further evidence on (i) whether the 
underlying structural shocks have actually occurred in reality and (ii) whether the actual 
developments of the variable of interest, real output, could be explained by them. 
 
Figure 11 - Percentage variance decomposition using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
monetary policy shock. 
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Figure 12 - Percentage variance decomposition using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
financial stress shock. 
 
Figures 13 and 14 display the historical decomposition results, which validate 
the stabilizing properties of monetary shocks by picking up the turning points 
accurately. On average, the negative effect of an interest rate tightening on output is 
greater in recessions than in booms as in Peersman and Smets (2005). We also find that 
in the post-euro period the monetary policy shock has generated greater output 
fluctuations, while the output effects of finance shocks have been smaller over the same 
period. 
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Figure 13 - Historical decomposition using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
monetary policy shock. 
 
Figure 14 - Historical decomposition using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
financial stress shock. 
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4.3. Sub-sample analysis 
We now look at the impulse-response functions for different sub-samples. We consider 
two periods: 1981:1-1998:4 (before the introduction of the Euro) and 1999:1-2007:4 
(after the introduction of the Euro). 
We start by considering a monetary policy shock (Figures 15 and 16). The major 
differences between the two sub-samples lie on the responses of real GDP, commodity 
price, money growth and financial stress. In what concerns the reaction of real GDP, 
one can see that, although in both samples, there is a contractionary effect, this was 
more pronounced in the past, in accordance with the lack of restructuring of the housing 
finance system, the existence of a regulated banking sector dominated by savings, loans 
and mutual savings banks, and a lower  competitiveness in the primary mortgage 
market. As for the commodity price, it is now much more sensitive to monetary policy 
actions than it used to be in the past: in the period 1981:1-1998:4, the positive interest 
rate shock has no significant impact on the commodity price, while, in the period 
1999:4-2007:4, it leads to a large (in magnitude) and quick fall of the price of 
commodities. Regarding monetary growth, the results suggest that in the period before 
Euro‟s introduction the monetary contraction was responsible for a fast portfolio 
reallocation, typically characterized by a flight towards assets that are less liquid but 
also earn higher rates of return (an increase in the M3 growth). In contrast, after the 
introduction of the Euro, an unexpected increase of the interest rate generates a fall in 
the M3 growth, which suggests that the policy action has an important liquidity effect 
that erodes after 4 quarters. In this context, Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) argue that 
the predictive role of nominal money for output and inflation has disappeared after the 
eighties. Finally, the reaction of the financial stress index to the monetary policy shock 
is interesting: while in both sub-samples there is a deterioration of financial stress 
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conditions, this is now last persistent than in the past. This result seems to be linked to 
the behavior of monetary policy itself: policy shocks were more persistent before the 
introduction of the Euro, possibly reflecting a stronger inertia of the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
 
Figure 15 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
monetary policy shock, 1981:1-1998:4. 
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Figure 16 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
monetary policy shock, 1999:1-2007:4. 
 
Figures 17 and 18 display the impulse-response functions to a financial stress 
shock over the two sub-sample periods. While there is no apparent difference in the 
magnitude of the response of GDP to the shock which falls in both sub-samples, the 
reaction of the interest rate should be emphasized. In fact, before the introduction of the 
Euro, there is no significant response of the interest rate to the financial stress shock. In 
contrast, the monetary authority seems to react both significantly and more quickly to 
the shock in the post-Euro period: the interest rate falls after the shock in financial stress 
and the trough (of almost 15 basis points) is reached after 4 quarters, suggesting that 
episodes of financial stress demand a stronger response by the monetary authority. 
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Figure 17 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
financial stress shock, 1981:1-1998:4. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
financial stress shock, 1999:1-2007:4. 
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4.4. Should monetary policy prevent a credit bubble? 
In this Section, we evaluate the credit channel by which monetary policy affects 
economic activity. In particular, we assess the conduct of monetary policy in terms of 
affecting the credit conditions and, similarly, whether it should prevent a rise in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio by means of avoiding potential credit bubbles. This approach 
focuses on evaluating the forecasting power of credit aggregates for real activity relative 
to the forecasting power of the money aggregate. This test for the credit channel suffers 
from the potentially incorrect assumption that credit aggregates are independent causal 
factors affecting the economy. In contrast, credit conditions and not the aggregate 
quantity of credit per se are an endogenous factor that help shaping the dynamic 
response of the economy to shifts in monetary policy. As a result, we replace the 
monetary growth by either the credit growth (Figure 19) or the loans-to-GDP ratio 
(Figure 20). 
The results remain robust vis-a-vis the previous findings, therefore, suggesting 
that monetary policy shocks affect not only the liquidity conditions of the economy as a 
whole, but also the credit dynamics. More specifically, Figure 19 shows that, after a 
monetary contraction, loans grow for almost 4 quarters, before fliping into a situation 
where there is a negative growth. Similarly, Figure 20 highlights that a positive interest 
rate shock leads to an increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio for about 10 quarters, after 
which that ratio starts falling. These findings are in line with the idea that, although both 
monetary and credit aggregates are jointly determined by supply and demand, money 
demand tends to be procyclical, while credit demand sems to display an important 
countercyclical component. This, in turn, can be explained by the desire of households 
and firms to smooth the impact of cyclical variations in income on spending or 
production. For instance, consumers may borrow in the outcome of a fall in their 
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income. Similarly, firms may try to finance an inventory buildup following a monetary 
tightening, even though the external finance premium is rising. As a result, at the time 
the monetary policy shock occurs, credit growth and loans-to-GDP ratio continue rising.  
 
Figure 19 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
the impact of a monetary policy shock on credit growth. 
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Figure 20 - Impulse-response functions using a B-SVAR framework: 
the impact of a monetary policy shock on loans-to-GDP ratio. 
 
 
It is also important to consider credit expansion in terms of the size of the 
economy in order to gauge the response of monetary policy. So we have included loan-
to-GDP ratio in the VAR replacing money growth, as loan growth itself may not capture 
a possible credit bubble because it can be volatile from year to year. However, when the 
credit-to-GDP ratio is growing very fast, this is a clear indication of a credit bubble in 
mature economies. Given the recent crisis, it makes sense to identify a finance shock 
where a rise in credit-to-GDP ratio (CYR) generates GDP growth with signs of financial 
stress (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Identifying Sign-Restrictions. 
 CMP GDP INF INT CYR FIN 
Monetary Policy 
Shock (tightening) 
? ? – + – ? 
Finance shock 
(Credit Bubble) 
? + ? ? + + 
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Figure 21 – Impulse-response functions using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
monetary policy shock (INT>0, CYR<0, INF<0), with monetary shock identified first 
and then financial shock (credit bubble and financial stress). 
Figure 22 – Impulse-response functions using a Sign-Restrictions approach: 
Credit Bubble shock (CYR>0, FIN>0, GDP>0), with monetary shock identified first 
and then financial shock (credit bubble and financial stress). 
 
 
While the monetary policy shock in Figure 21 stabilises the price level by 
reducing inflation, the monetary policy response due to a credit bubble and subsequent 
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stress in other financial markets in Figure 22 suggests that the monetary authority must 
react by increasing the interest rate. So rapid expansions in credit in mature economies 
can raise concerns of possible financial imbalances and, thus, monetary authorities 
should aim at balancing the markets by tightening interest rates as shown in our 
responses in Figure 22. In contrast, a low-interest rate policy stance in such 
circumstances can create systemic risk elsewhere in the financial markets leading to a 
crisis. Over the years, the ECB pursued a monetary policy aimed at stabilising inflation 
around the objective target of 2%. However,  in recent times, a period of very low 
nominal interest rates and even negative real interest rates gave rise to a credit bubble. 
Our results suggest that if interest rates had gone up to counter the bubble, a financial 
collapse might not have occurred. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides time-series evidence on the transmission of monetary policy and 
financial stress in the Eurozone. We use modern estimation techniques to identify the 
monetary policy and the financial stress shocks, namely, the Bayesian Structural Vector 
Auto-Regressive (B-SVAR) along with the more recent Sign-Restrictions approach. 
The analysis is based on high-frequency (quarterly) data for the period 1980:1-
2008:4, and the model includes 6 key variables: the interest rate (that is, the policy rate), 
a set of macroeconomic variables that adjust to the shock with a lag (real GDP, inflation 
rate, and commodity price), and a set of variables that react contemporaneously to the 
policy shock (the growth rate of the monetary aggregate, and the Financial Stress 
Index). 
We show that a monetary policy contraction generates an important deterioration 
of financial stress conditions. This effect is magnified during recessions, as the period of 
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1991-1993, but also the recent financial turmoil reveal. We also find that a shock in 
financial stress conditions has a strong contractionary effect. Moreover, it requires an 
aggressive response by the monetary authority, namely, through the adoption of 
expansionary policies. As a result, our paper provides support for the need for keeping a 
close track of financial stress conditions, as well as the importance of implementing 
macro-prudential risk management. 
The current paper is the first stage for further work. Specifically, a promising 
research avenue that we aim to explore refers to the estimation of a monetary policy rule 
that accounts for developments in the financial stress conditions. Indeed, it will provide 
the basis for forecasting future central bank‟s policy behaviour in those circumstances 
and, simultaneously, allow us to understand the major economic developments to which 
the monetary authority reacts in a systematic manner. In this context, Martin and Milas 
(2004) apply a nonlinear quadratic logistic smooth-transition (STR) model to the Bank 
of England‟s monetary policy. Interestingly, the authors show that the UK monetary 
authority tries to keep inflation within a range rather than pursuing a point target, and 
show that nonlinearity is important. Similarly, Surico (2007a, 2007b) and Castro 
(2010a) argue that central banks can have asymmetric preferences – for instance, they 
might assign different weights to negative and positive gaps in inflation, output or even 
in monetary variables included in their loss function. This, in turn, gives rise to the 
existence of a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function.  We leave this line of 
investigation for the future. 
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